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he expansionary fiscal impact of the reduction in Federal income
tax rates in early 1964 contributed, along with a continuing gen-
erally expansive monetary policy, to rapid improvement in the
U.S. economy. Gross national product, corporate profits, and per-
sonal income have risen sharply since then, and the rate of unem-
ployment has dropped. With the resulting increase in the income
base, tax collections more than offset the impact of the reduction
in tax rates. The expansion in cash receipts of the U.S. Govern-
ment during fiscal year 1965 was twice the increase in its payments,
and the cash deficit declined to the lowest level since the fiscal
year 1961.
Despite the decline in the deficit, net demands by the U.S. Treas-
ury on credit markets were about unchanged from the previous
year. Borrowing was concentrated, as usual, in the July-December
half of the fiscal year. Net repayment of debt was possible during
the January-June period of 1965, and the net repayment was
larger than during the same period of the previous 3 years. Un-
expectedly large tax receipts and small cash payments in the
spring made possible both the debt repayment and a build-up in
the Treasury's cash balance by mid-1965 to a level about $1.5
billion above a year earlier.
Debt retirement in the first half of 1965 was accomplished
mainly by the repayment of maturing tax anticipation bills in
March and June. The reduction in the supply of Treasury bills
contributed to the downward pressures on bill rates that developed
during the spring. In the late summer and early autumn bill rates
again came under upward pressure, and by mid-November the
3-month bill yielded 4.09 per cent. Many factors—including
market anticipations of increased Federal spending because of
Viet Nam, more buoyant business forecasts, and existing liquid-
ity pressures on banks and corporations—contributed to this pres-
sure. Moreover, direct additions to market bill supplies occurred
in October and November as the Treasury sold tax bills in order
to meet its autumn needs for cash.
Interest rates on long-term U.S. Government securities have
recently risen to an average of 4.35 per cent, influenced by some
of the same expectational factors affecting bill rates and by con-
tinued large issues of securities in the corporate and municipal
markets. Debt lengthening activities by the Treasury—chiefly
through advance refundings—increased the supply of long-term
debt during the past fiscal year, but long-term interest rates
changed little until the late summer of 1965.
Cash outlays of the Federal Government rose by only $2 billion
in the fiscal year 1965. Such outlays for defense, as shown in the
cash budget, actually declined by $3.7 billion to a total of $50.8
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billion. But over the period there were increases in outlays for
other functions.
The decline in defense outlays was reflected in a reduction in
total Federal purchases of goods and services as measured in the
national income accounts. These purchases declined in fiscal year
1965 for the first time since 1959. Other government expenditures
—grants-in-aid, transfer payments, net interest, and subsidies—
continued to rise, however, and for the fiscal year as a whole,
Federal expenditures as shown in the national income accounts
rose by only a little more than $1 billion.
The small difference between the increase in Federal expendi-
tures as shown in the national income accounts and the somewhat
larger rise in outlays in the cash budget represents principally the
continued growth in Federal cash payments generated primarily
by the lending activities of the Government. These credit transac-
tions are not included as expenditures in the national income ac-
counts.
Federal receipts rose by more than $4.0 billion in the 1965
fiscal year on both a cash and national income basis. Even though
there were sizable reductions in Federal income tax rates for both
corporations and individuals in March 1964, tax collections in-
creased as a direct result of the accelerated growth in both cor-
porate and individual incomes that followed the tax reduction.
Rapidly rising corporate profits, both in dollar terms and as a per
cent of gross national product, provided such a greatly expanded
tax base that profits taxes were larger than a year previous, despite
the reduction in tax rates. With the withholding rate for individ-
uals reduced from 18 to 14 per cent, withheld income taxes were
lower in fiscal year 1965 than in fiscal year 1964. However, non-
withheld taxes, net of refunds, rose by a virtually offsetting amount,
as there were unusually large net final payments on 1964 personal
tax liabilities in the spring of 1965.
The first phase of the reduction in excise taxes, which became
effective in late June of 1965, together with the second phase,
which will become effective on January 1, 1966, is expected to
reduce Federal revenues by $2.2 billion in the current fiscal year.
The economic impact of these reductions will be partially offset
by the impact of increased social security taxes scheduled for the
beginning of 1966; this will add $1.5 billion to fiscal year 1966
cash revenues. On an annual basis the increase in social security
tax liabilities is expected to range from $5 billion to $6 billion.
FISCAL POLICY
During the fiscal year 1965 the interaction of discretionary
fiscal policy designed to stimulate economic growth and of the
effects of that growth on the tax base produced a decline in the
Federal Reserve Bulletin: November 1965FISCAL POLICY AND DEBT MANAGEMENT 1509
Federal budgetary deficit. Economic expansion has an automatic
impact on both Federal revenues and expenditures. An expanding
GNP tends to reduce Federal expenditures—primarily in the form
of reduced unemployment compensation—and to increase receipts
—reflecting the higher levels of incomes. The combination tends
to bring about smaller deficits or larger surpluses.
During the past year such developments occurred at the same
time that discretionary fiscal policy—the tax cut—was tending
to increase the deficit. The net effect of these two forces was to
reduce the deficit. Since the budget deficit or surplus reflects both
fiscal policy actions and the level of income and output, it is use-
ful to have a supplementary measure that separates the effects of
changes in the economy on the budget from the effects of changes
in the budget on the economy. To this end, calculation of Federal
receipts and expenditures based on the full-employment concept
was developed.
Full-employment surplus. The full-employment calculation intro-
duced in the Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers
CHART 1
EXPANSIONARY fiscal policy rtfUcted in reduced
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for 1962 is designed to estimate what Federal receipts and expen-
ditures would be if the economy were operating at or near full
employment, which for these purposes is taken to be a 4 per cent
rate of unemployment. The full-employment level of GNP is esti-
mated as what GNP would be if it had grown, in constant prices,
at an annual rate of 3.5 per cent from mid-1955 through 1962
and 3.75 per cent since then. Federal expenditures in the full-
employment calculation of the budget are assumed to equal actual
Federal expenditures, except that outlays for unemployment
benefits would be less at the 4 per cent unemployment rate. Full-
employment receipts are estimated by applying Federal tax rates
to the calculated values of full-employment GNP and income. Such
a calculation of Federal receipts and expenditures tends to elimi-
nate the impact of the business cycle on Federal receipts and
expenditures.
Changes in the calculated full-employment surplus thus reflect
only growth in full-employment GNP and changes in tax rates and
budget expenditures. Since the levels of GNP necessary to sustain
full employment must increase through time, Federal revenue
derived from full-employment levels of income rises also, and
therefore the full-employment surplus has a tendency to grow un-
less offset by increased expenditures or reductions in tax rates.
Comparison of the calculated full-employment surplus in one
time period with that in another is a method of evaluating the im-
pact of the Federal budget on the economy. If the full-employment
surplus is smaller in one year than it had been the year before, it is
possible to say that fiscal policy was more expansionary in the
year with the smaller surplus. Since a Federal surplus is, in effect,
an additional form of saving, the appropriate size of the full-
employment surplus or deficit depends on the strength of private
demands. When private demands are very strong, a relatively large
full-employment surplus is desirable so as to help forestall infla-
tionary pressures; on the other hand, when private demands are
not sufficient to generate high levels of economic activity, a rela-
tively small full-employment surplus (or deficit) helps to provide
necessary stimulation to the economy. The actual and full-employ-
ment estimates of Federal expenditures, receipts, and the surplus
or deficit are shown in Chart 1.
Impact of the tax cut. Actual Federal receipts reached a low of
$112 billion (seasonally adjusted annual rate) in the second quar-
ter of 1964, the first quarter the tax cut was fully effective. By
the second quarter of 1965, Federal receipts had risen by nearly
$12 billion. Application of the new tax rates to the estimates of
full-employment aggregate income indicates that the increase in
full-employment revenues over this period would have been $7.7
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billion. Thus, it would appear that $4.0 billion, or about a third,
of the actual increase in Federal revenues during fiscal year 1965
resulted from acceleration in the rate of economic expansion as
the economy began to move toward full-employment goals.
It should be noted, however, that the way in which the reduc-
tion in individual income taxes was put into effect, described
earlier, not only was responsible to some extent for the quick
acceleration in actual economic growth after the cut in taxes but
also accounted for part of the rapid increase in both full-employ-
ment and actual receipts in the spring of 1965.
The stimulative impact of the tax cut can be most clearly seen
from the figures in the last line of Table 1, which shows the
budgetary full-employment surplus—that is, the balance between
what Federal receipts and outlays would have been at an unem-
ployment rate of 4 per cent. This surplus declined sharply in the
January-June period of 1964, when the tax cut became effective.
The lower surplus reflected the reduction in tax rates, which left
TABLE 1
THREE MEASURES OF THE FEDERAL BUDGET









































































1 Sum of the two seasonally adjusted quarters divided by two.
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a larger proportion of incomes available for spending by indi-
viduals and businesses. The full-employment surplus rose some-
what after January-June 1964. However, during the July-Decem-
ber period of 1965 the lower levels of excise taxes, the rise in
social security benefits, and the increased expenditures for defense
















e Treasury, the ini-
tial impact of the tax cut was to increase the Federal deficit.
From the figures in the top section of Table 1, it can be seen that
the seasonal deficit in the July-December period was enlarged
somewhat in the calendar year 1964 after the tax cut. But this
was followed by a sharper than usual swing to surplus in January-
June 1965, as tax receipts began to come in strongly and as ex-
penditures, especially for defense, changed little. The cash deficit
in the fiscal year 1965 was $2.7 billion, as compared with $4.8
billion the year before.
The extent to which the Treasury borrows is largely a reflection
of cash receipt and payment flows as they are netted out in the
cash deficit. But the Treasury may also cover a cash operating
deficit over short periods by drawing down its cash operating
balances held primarily at commercial banks. Conversely, if it
has seasonal cash surpluses, it may use them to increase its cash
balance instead of retiring debt.
Over the last several fiscal years net cash borrowing by the
Treasury has varied more widely than has the cash deficit. Al-
though the cash deficit in fiscal year 1965 declined from the prior
fiscal year, net cash borrowing rose slightly to a level of $4.3 bil-
lion. The unexpectedly large cash surplus in the latter part of
fiscal year 1965 in fact gave rise to a very high Treasury operating
TABLE 2
COMPARISON OF U.S. TREASURY DEFICITS AND
BORROWING, FISCAL YEARS 1961-65
(IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
Item 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
Cash deficit -2.3 -5.8 -4.0 -4.8 -2.7
Less: Change in cash balance -1.5 3.9 1.6 -.9 1.7
Equals: Net cash borrowing .7 9.6 5.6 3.9 4.3
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balance, $11.5 billion, on June 30. This balance was subsequently
drawn down in the process of meeting the July-September seasonal
deficit of the new fiscal year.
About half of the Treasury's cash borrowing in the fiscal year
1965 represented an increase in marketable debt. Most of the
remainder represented the net effect of debt operations of Gov-
ernment agencies and trust funds and the issuance of nonmarket-
able foreign securities; a small portion represented an increase in
savings bonds.
In recent years the marketable debt of the U.S. Government
has grown roughly in step with the steady deficits in the Treasury's
cash budgets. In fiscal years 1961-65 marketable debt rose by
about $25.0 billion, including the $2.2 billion increase in fiscal
year 1965. Last year's increase was the smallest for the period,
however.
Although the change in total marketable debt is determined
mainly by budgetary considerations, the Treasury in its role as
debt manager to a large extent controls the structure and compo-
sition of the marketable debt. Market demand is always a con-
sideration in the choice of type of issue and maturity, but within
the market framework the Treasury has been able to alter sig-
nificantly the debt structure. The existence of the statutory 4YA
per cent ceiling on the interest rate on Treasury bonds poses a
problem for debt management, however, whenever market bond
yields rise above that level, as they have recently.
Debt management In fiscal year 1961 the Treasury's debt man-
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in two ways. First came the program of increasing the volume of
Treasury bills outstanding, thus putting the short-term bill rate
under upward pressure in hopes of reducing outflows of short-
term capital. Secondly, in order to alleviate the shortening effects
that the large new issues of bills had on the debt structure and in
order to reverse the almost continual shortening of the debt that
had taken place since 1946, the Treasury undertook an extensive
program of debt lengthening. While new cash borrowing during
this period has been concentrated in Treasury bills, the Treasury
has been using its refunding operations—particularly advance re-
fundings of groups of outstanding issues—to lengthen the debt.
Operations in the 1965 fiscal year followed this general pattern.
In addition to relying on 3-month, 6-month, and 1-year bills
for new cash over a full fiscal year, the Treasury in several recent
years has issued tax anticipation bills maturing in March and June
TABLE 3
TREASURY MARKETABLE DEBT: CHANGES IN VOLUME
AND MATURITY STRUCTURE—FISCAL YEAR 1965
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1 Certain bonds when issued carry the option that they may be turned in in lieu of paying estate taxes.
Hence, marketable debt may rise by less than the amount of Treasury financings and the changes due to
the passage of time would indicate.
NOTE.—Details may not add to totals because of rounding.
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to phase in the sharp seasonal turn-around from cash deficit in
July-December to cash surplus in January-June. Inasmuch as it
had a large cash balance on June 30, 1965, the Treasury did not
undertake any new borrowing in the first quarter of the 1966 fiscal
year, as it had in earlier years. However a heavy concentration of
new cash borrowing, including $6.5 billion of tax anticipation bills,
was necessary in the October-December quarter of 1965.
Further lengthening of the debt in the 1965 fiscal year was the
result primarily of the two largest advance refundings to date.
In these refundings—undertaken in July 1964 and January 1965
—$19.1 billion of debt with fewer than 3 years to maturity was
shifted into the 5- to 10-year and the over-20-year maturity classes.
A concomitant feature of the advance refunding technique of
debt lengthening has been the Treasury's use of shorter-term
issues in its regular refundings. During the fiscal year 1965 new
issues offered in the four refundings, with but one exception,
carried maturities of 21 months or less.
Changes in structure. Changes in the maturity structure of the
debt reflect, in addition to Treasury operations, the continual
shortening of the debt with the passage of time. As a case in
point, during the 1965 fiscal year a total of $35.8 billion of secu-
rities passed into the within-1-year maturity area. Treasury debt
lengthening operations were large enough to offset all but $6.2
billion of the rise in this maturity category, however. And despite
the effects of the passage of time, the Treasury expanded by $5.2
billion its debt maturing in more than 5 years.
Another measure of the debt extension that has resulted dur-
ing the year is the increase in the average maturity of the mar-
ketable public debt. During fiscal year 1965 the average maturity
rose by 4 months to a level of 5 years 4 months on June 30.
TERM STRUCTURE
Yields on short- and long-term U.S. Government securities OF INTEREST RVTES
moved closer together during fiscal year 1965 and during recent
months, as illustrated by a further flattening of the yield curve. A
more rapid rise in short-term rates than in long-term rates has
been a feature of the current expansion as well as of previous
expansionary periods.
The flattening of the yield structure in fiscal year 1965 was
consistent with expectations during most of the year as to how
interest rates would move in the future and also with monetary
policy actions. Long-term rates were generally expected to be
stable, while upward movements in short-term rates were always
a possibility because of the persisting U.S. balance of payments
deficit. The Federal Reserve discount rate was in fact raised
from ZVi to 4 per cent in late November 1964 at the time of the
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sterling crisis, and 3-month Treasury bill rates in this country rose
from around 3.50 per cent to a 3.80-3.90 per cent range. In the
winter and spring of 1965 some additional firming of monetary
policy became evident as member banks were forced into net
borrowed reserve positions, and some short-term rates edged
higher.
CHART 3




NOTE.—Curves are fitted to monthly averages of daily yields for outstanding U.S. Govt.
securities.
In themselves, changes in the supplies of debt in various matu-
rities that were made available to the nonbank public through
debt management operations and through market transactions of
official and bank investors were not such as to raise short-term
rates relative to long-term ones. In fact, short-term debt declined
while long-term debt in the portfolios of these nonbank public in-
vestors rose. For the entire fiscal year the amount of short-term
debt—that is, debt maturing in less than 1 year—held by the non-
bank public declined by $9.2 billion, while its holdings of debt
maturing in fewer than 5 years declined by $8.6 billion. Within
this total, however, bill holdings rose by more than $0.7 billion.
And supplies of Treasury bills, which are traded very actively,
may be a more influential factor in short-term rate movements
than are supplies of short-term coupon issues.
While its holdings of shorter-term debt declined, the nonbank
public increased its holdings of over-5-year maturities by $8.6
billion. This lengthening of investor portfolios was not accom-
panied by any significant rise in Government bond yields during
the period. To some extent the failure of long-term yields to move
higher in response to the increased supply might be attributed to
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the technique of lengthening employed by the Treasury. Most
debt lengthening undertaken during the year was done in advance
refundings, which tend to minimize upward rate pressures result-
ing from the increased supply of long-term issues outstanding.
The portfolio preferences of commercial banks are one of the
most important factors leading to changes in the volume and ma-
turity structure of Government securities held by the nonbank
public. Changes in bank holdings of U.S. Government securities
often seem to be less the result of movements in market yields on
these securities than the result of such factors as loan demand,
the growth in time deposits, and monetary policy.
Banks have been active sellers of coupon issues maturing in
fewer than 5 years during recent years of the current economic
expansion, and their market sales and cash redemptions of these
issues accelerated in fiscal year 1965. At the same time banks have
invested heavily—$9.9 billion in fiscal 1965—in coupon issues
with over-5-year maturities. With the further rise in ceiling rates
on time deposits and the continued growth in such deposits, the
incentive for banks to invest in relatively high-yielding assets re-
mained strong. These long-term securities were acquired by the
banks chiefly through switches out of short-term and intermediate-
term issues in connection with Treasury advance refundings.
Since July of this year yields on both short-term and long-term
securities have moved higher, and the differential between short-
and long-term rates has narrowed further. Interest rates generally
rose as expectations of a more ebullient economic expansion than
had been foreseen became widespread when the administration an-
nounced a step-up in U.S. participation in the Vietnamese war
and as private demands for credit continued strong. Reflecting
these developments and with monetary policy remaining firm,
with bank liquidity progressively being reduced as loan demand
remained strong, and with the Treasury returning to the bill mar-
ket with large issues to finance its cash needs, the rate on 3-month
Treasury bills has most recently risen to 4.09 per cent.
Partly in sympathy with the rise in short-term rates, yields on
long-term U.S. Government securities posted increases of about
20 basis points, on the average, from late July to mid-November.
The extent of this rise in long-term rates appears also to have
been influenced by the large supplies of long-term Treasury secu-
rities that were issued during fiscal year 1965, some of which were
still in the hands of Government securities dealers at the time
market expectations shifted. In addition, the rate increase was
affected by the continued large volume of corporate and municipal
security issues, which led to a widening of the spread between
yields on U.S. Government and other long-term securities.
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